Gwanghaegun

By Jonathan Hongsoon Kim

             History, from a certain perspective, can be seen as a series of conflicts. Struggles of people against their surroundings, disagreements amongst individuals, or all out confrontations between groups of people have probably existed for as long as humans themselves. People all try to pursue their interests, and in this process may clash with the interests of others, leading to problems. We have seen this sequence happen countless times n the past and, most definitely, conflicts will continue to exist in the future. What is important is how to deal with these problems when they appear. When caught in a fight, either as a combatant or an observer, certain people have shown ideas and behavior that could wisely lead his or her followers out of the hassle. Solving a conflict was not always achieved by military victory or tactical genius. Certain leaders in history, though not always successful in executing their ideas, have demonstrated surprising insight that could have brought clashes to a very different end.

             Gwanghaegun (광해군, 光海君, 1575 ~ 1641), a king of Joseon, was one these people. In medieval times, the Korean Peninsula was the domain of the Joseon Kingdom. Erected in 1392, Joseon was a state that had its ideological roots in Confucianism. During the early years of Joseon, Confucianism was accepted as little more than an ideal way of life. Scholars studied Confucianism and advocated it to the king and the public; other studies such as science or military technology were also encouraged in order to improve Joseon’s competitiveness as a whole. However, as time passed, the emphasis on Confucianism started to become dominative. Eventually, around the 15^th century, Neo-Confucianism had become a solid religion almost, amongst the nobles and scholars of Joseon, with other fields of study being disregarded.

Around this time, the scholars started to genuinely respect China. According to the Confucian doctrine, smaller nations had the duty to serve a larger nation—in this case the Ming dynasty of China—as a “parent nation” and become a vassal state. In early Joseon, people saw China as perhaps a slightly more powerful business partner. They usually agreed to Ming China’s demands, but knew when to disagree—as was the case of King Sejo, who, more than once, refused to meet the Ming’s request for military backup. However, by this time, defying China was almost unthinkable; to be able to serve the larger empire had come to be a duty and great honor.

In 1608, amongst this social ambiance, Gwanghaegun became king. Merely years before his ascendancy, he saw firsthand the horrors of war and the ineffectiveness the Neo-Confucianism based Joseon government; the Japanese invasion of 1592 became the most vicious war in Joseon’s history and destroyed two thirds of Joeson’s territory as well as 500,000 Koreans. Following his ascendancy, he immediately made evident the fact that he was not a traditional Confucian king. He did not directly accept the philosophies his subjects tried to teach him, and he also recruited scholars that were viewed as heathens by his subjects but were talented in other fields of academics, especially military science. However, Gwanghaegun’s greatest test came in 1618, when the Later Jinn dynasty in China declared war on the Ming. The Manchurian people, who established the Later Jinn, in 1616, were considered barbarians by both the Ming and Joseon; their rapid growth and sudden attack on the Ming was unexpected. The waning Ming dynasty was hardly prepared for such an assault and was overwhelmed; the Ming almost immediately requested Joseon’s help. The nobles and military officials had no reason to doubt that Joseon’s best soldiers would be sent to the Ming’s aid. However, Gwanghaegun’s response shocked them. He was cautious; he knew that Joseon, only now recovering from the war with Japan, was hardly in shape for another war. This was the main argument he advocated when defending his position from the nobles, but he had a deeper insight than simply thinking that a war would be inconvenient (Hanguk).

Gwanghaegun wished to initiate international policies that would actually benefit the nation of Joseon. He assessed correctly that siding with the Ming—just because it was the supreme “civilized” nation and the Later Jinn the “barbaric”—was a shortsighted idea. The Ming was gradually losing its superiority in mainland China; it was predictable that the Later Jinn would conquer a great chunk of China, if not the entire continent. Gwanghaegun wished to remain as neutral as possible in such an unstable struggle, and explained this plan of neutrality to his subjects. Regardless of his efforts, the upper class scholars of Joseon refused to acknowledge Gwanghaegun’s logic and continuously argued for supporting the Ming. Gwanghaegun was eventually forced to dispatch troops, but not before secretly cautioning the battalion’s leading general to avoid direct confrontation with the Manchu, and to and surrender when necessary; the general complied and casualties were minimized (Park 161).

However, when Gwanghaegun’s covert orders were discovered, the nobles of Joseon were fed up with their king’s refusal to comply with the Neo-Confucian dogma. They rebelled, using Gwanghaegun’s “treason” against the Ming as an excuse, and chose Injo, a relative of Gwanghaegun and leader of the rebellion, as the new king. Injo immediately took a hard-line stance against the Later Jinn and made sure Joseon did its duty as a vassal. He initiated an all out war against the Manchu, even after the Ming was defeated. Ignoring the suggestions of peace made by the Later Jinn, Injo continued the destructive fight against them. In 1636, following an all out invasion by the Manchu—who now called themselves the Qing—Injo surrendered the nation under his responsibility to the Qing. Injo was forced to participate in a grueling capitulation process. In less than 40 years after the Japanese were barely driven out, the refusal to recognize the reality of the Joseon nobles had brought upon the nation another great tragedy.

Gwanghaegun wished to preserve the relatively weak nation of Joseon that was stuck in a dangerous power struggle. He realized that blindly siding with either side was risky. He tried to remain as neutral as possible and gain what he could for Joseon in the process. Although the Ming dynasty and Later Jinn have both long disappeared in history, I believe that this idea can indeed be implemented to modern day nations, including Korea.

South Korea was traditionally associated with the USA. After Korea was split into two following its independence from the Japanese Empire, the Southern part of the peninsula was influenced greatly by the US and was on the capitalist half of the world during the Cold War. Because of this strong capitalist emphasis, anti-communist sentiment was prominent, and the government was adverse towards nations such as China. Although, after the end of the Cold War, this phenomena has been somewhat reduced, our current president, president Myung-bak Lee, is once again demonstrating great affiliation towards the US and keeping a distance with China (Lee 35). President Lee has, and still is, aimed towards strengthening an alliance with the US, even with the discontent or sacrifice of the Korean citizens themselves (Ecumanian).

However, absolutely favoring the USA over other nations is not that safe of a stance. China is continuously growing in several different aspects, and within due time, could match the US in terms of economy as early as 2035 (Altman and Barboza 5). Viewing China as no more than a communist villain in such an era may be as risky as Injo’s diplomacy. Though not in the form of military invasion, China could express its resentment later on, as was the case of the Later Jinn. As Korea once again finds itself stuck between two potent nations, cautious diplomacy is needed. As with Gwanghaegun’s hesitance to immediately come to the Ming’s aid, it is necessary for a leader of a nation to find a path that would benefit the nation itself, not other nations that it wants to appease or be associated with. The same would apply to modern Korea. Blindly trusting the power of the US is not a wise idea. To maintain good relations with both the US and China, not leaning or being biased towards either, is the way that would probably open Korea up to the most opportunities in the future.

             Gwanghaegun refused to be restricted by the ties of tradition or appeasement when initiating diplomacy that would be practical and favorable for his own He wanted to ensure that his country could keep its sovereignty and dignity in a chaotic situation through policies that focused not on the so-called obligations of tradition, but on practicality. Such policies of practicality and sensibility were Gwanghaegun’s method of dealing with the conflicts he encountered, and this attitude is one that leaders of modern day nations should not be afraid to take.

Works Cited

Altman, Daniel and David Barboza. “That Blur? It’s China, Moving Up In the Pack.” International Herald Tribune December 21^st, 2005: 5

Ecumanian, 믿음으로 보는 기독교 정론지 (Mideumeuroboneun Sesang Gidokgyo Jeongronji). 17 Apr. 2008. Web. 09 Ecumanian. Apr. 2011. <http://www.ecumenian.com/>.

Lee, Sug-i. “ 국제 사회에서 앉은뱅이 된 이명박 외교” (Gugje Sahoeeseo Anjeunbaengidoen Lee Myung-bak Oegyo, Myung-bak Lee’s Diplomacy: A Cripple in the International Society). SisaIN 153(2010): 35.

Park, Si-baek. Joseon Wangjo Sillok 11: Gwanghaegun Ilgi (Chronology of Joseon Kings 11: Chronology of Gwanghaegun). Seoul: Humanist, 2008.

Park, Si-baek. Joseon Wangjo Sillok 12: Injo Sillok (Chronology of Joseon Kings 12: Chronology of Injo). Seoul: Humanist, 2008.

한국역사연구회 (HangukYeoksaYeonguhuei Webzine, Korean History Research Center) Homepage. 5 January 2004. 한국역사연구회., May 2011. <http://www.koreanhistory.org/>